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In recent years labour migration from Central and Eastern Europe has increased, resulting in a com-
paratively stable and high inflow of remittances into these countries. This briefing explores how the 
current economic crisis impacts on the development of migration and remittance flows into EU-10
1 
and CIS countries. There is evidence for a reduction of migration movements in the short run and a 
likely decrease of remittance flows into this reg
 
 
                                                       
1
 In this briefing, EU-10 countries include all new EU-members from the 2007 round minus Malta and Cyprus; EU-8 countries 
exclude Bulgaria and Romania. 
Introduction 
With the political transformation in Central and 
Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s and 
later with the break-up of the Soviet Union, a 
new migration space developed in the region. 
The opening of formerly closed borders al-
lowed an increasing number of people to leave 
their home countries. At the beginning of these 
migratory movements political and ethnic moti-
vations prevailed, encouraging ethnic minority 
populations to return to their (perceived) nation 
states. Later, economic migration gained im-
portance, especially considering that a sub-
stantial part of mobility is short-term and often 
irregular. Labour migration from Central and 
Eastern European countries, now members of 
the European Union, was primarily directed 
towards the EU-15, while migrants from the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
headed for Russia as well as the European 
Union and overseas destinations. In many 
cases, the new labour exporting countries 
allowed a relaxation of their labour markets 
due to emigrations, although adverse effects 
such as brain drain and sectoral labour short-
age occurred as well. Migrant-sending coun-
tries in Central and Eastern Europe enjoyed 
the inflow of remittances which contributed to 
poverty reduction and in some cases helped to 
stimulate the economy. In the light of this de-
velopment it is of crucial concern how the cur-
rent economic crisis will impact on migration 
and on the receipt of remittances in this region. 
 
 
International migration, remittances 
and the current economic crisis 
The current economic crisis will most likely 
impact notably on international labour migra-
tion and on the flow of remittances to migrant 
sending countries. Because labour migrants 
are considered to represent the most flexible 
and vulnerable part of the labour force, eco-
nomic recession can be expected to result in a 
dismissal of migrants or in a cut of their wages. OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG 
Furthermore, receiving countries usually re-
strict the entrance of labour migrants in times 
of economic crisis and enforce immigration 
laws. To protect their labour markets, govern-
ments of immigration countries also encourage 
the return of foreign labour to their home re-
gion in providing incentives to leave. Thus, the 
global economic crisis will force a number of 
(irregular) migrants to return to their home 
countries, while less people in sending regions 
will be in a position to leave. However, legal 
migrants will have a strong incentive to stay 
abroad as their home country economies are 
hit by the crisis as well, resulting in a deteriora-
tion of employment perspectives at home. 
Additionally, stricter entrance regulations often 
discourage migrants from returning home, 
because they anticipate not being able to re-
migrate again. 
The amount of remittances depends on the 
stock of migrants working abroad, their pro-
pensity to send money home and on the eco-
nomic situation of labour absorbing countries 
(Ratha 2003). In this context the sector profile 
of migrants is crucial as foreigners often work 
in cyclically-sensitive sectors, such as con-
struction, trade and tourism. Consequently 
labour migrants are particularly exposed to 
economic shocks, which typically translate into 
a reduction of remittances. In the current eco-
nomic crisis remittance flows to developing 
and transformation countries diminished in the 
third quarter of 2008, while for 2009 a reduc-
tion of remittance flows by five to eight percent 
is estimated (Ratha and Mohapatra 2009). 
Against the background of growing remittances 
by double-digit rates in the past few years, this 
is particularly harmful for transition and devel-
oping economies where remittances consid-
erably contributed to poverty reduction (Chami 
et al. 2008, World Bank 2006). Moreover, re-
mittances seem to be more stable than private 
capital flows. According to the Institute of In-
ternational Finance, net private capital flows to 
developing countries declined by 50% between 
2007 and 2008, and for 2009 a further cutback 
of 65% is expected. 
 
 
Migration and remittances in the new 
EU-member states 
After the European Union enlargements of 
2004 and 2007, the new Central and Eastern 
European member countries experienced an 
increased labour migration, primarily towards 
the EU-15. The first enlargement round in 
2004 triggered an annual net migration of ap-
proximately 220.000 persons from the EU-8 
countries to the EU-15; considerably exceed-
ing past movements. Between 1989 and 2003, 
the average annual net migration from Central 
and Eastern European countries – joining the 
EU in 2004 – to the EU-15 amounted to ap-
proximately 56.000 people. As a result of tran-
sition arrangements on labour migration, the 
most important receiving EU-15 countries were 
Ireland and Great Britain which opened their 
labour markets to the new EU members after 
May 2004. As in the case of the EU-8 coun-
tries, migration from Bulgaria and Romania 
towards the EU-15 started years before 
enlargement in 2007. This is reflected by the 
fact that by the end of 2007 nearly 1.86 million 
Bulgarians and Romanians were living in the 
EU-15, while in the year 2000, only 278.000 
citizens from these countries resided there. 
Greece, Italy, Ireland and Spain admitted the 
greatest part of Bulgarian and Romanian im-
migrants. 
As a result of the ongoing migration from 
Central and Eastern Europe since the political 
transformation at the end of the 1980s, a sub-
stantial number of citizens from these coun-
tries have established themselves abroad and 
regularly send money home. By now, for many 
of the EU-10 countries remittances constitute a 
comparatively stable source of external financ-
ing (see table 1). In 2008, two EU-10 coun-
tries, Poland and Romania belonged to the top 
10 remittances-recipient economies worldwide 
(Ratha et al. 2008). It has to be remarked that 
remittances do not seem to have strong effects 
on investment and entrepreneurship in the EU-
10 economies (Kaczmarczyk and Okolski 
2008). Most remittances receiving households 
in Poland, Romania and the Baltic states 
spend these resources on consumption, pri-
vate housing, durable goods, and in some 
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Table 1:   Remittances to EU-10 countries, 2004-2008  
 (US$  million) 
  2004 2005 2006 2007  2008e 
Bulgaria 1.723  1.613 1.707 2.086 2.200 
Czech Republic  815  1.026 1.190 1.332 1.410 
Estonia  167 264 402 426 426 
Hungary  307 280 363 413 413 
Latvia  229 381 482 552 583 
Lithuania 325  534  994  1.427  1.427 
Poland 4.728  6.482  8.496 10.496  11.000 
Romania  132  4.733 6.718 8.533 9.000 
Slovakia 529  946  1.088  1.483  1.500 
Slovenia  266 264 282 284 300 
e = estimation 
Source: World Bank 2009 
 
 
While the inflow of remittances has in-
creased in all of the EU-10 member states 
between 2004 and 2008, the growth rates of 
remittances developed quite differently in 
these countries (see table 2). In the Baltic 
states, the Czech Republic and Poland remit-
tances attained the highest percentage in-
creases between 2004 and 2006, whereas 
Romania experienced an outstanding jump in 
remittance growth between 2004 and 2005. 
This reflects different migration intensities and 
money sending patterns of labour migrants of 




Table 2:   Growth rates of remittance flows, 2004-2008 
  2004 2005 2006 2007  2008e 
Bulgaria 0.3%  -0.1%  5.8%  22.2%  5.5% 
Czech Republic  63.3%  25.9% 15.8% 11.9%  5.9% 
Estonia 69.5%  58.0%  52.3% 6.0%  0.0% 
Hungary 4.0%  -8.8%  29.6%  13.8%  0.0% 
Latvia 24.5%  66.4%  26.5% 14.5%  5.5% 
Lithuania 182.6%  64.3%  86.1% 43.6%  0.0% 
Poland  78.0% 37.1% 31.2% 23.5%  4.8% 
Romania 6.5%  3485.6%  41.9% 27.0%  5.5% 
Slovakia 24.7%  78.8% 15.0% 36.3%  1.1% 
Slovenia 11.7%  -0.8%  6.8%  0.7%  2.1% 
e = estimation 
Source: World Bank 2009 
 
 
Although remittances to a number of EU-10 
countries are high, expressed in US$ terms, as 
a percentage of GDP they are not outstanding. 
In Bulgaria and Romania remittances 
amounted to 4.2 and 4.5 percent of GDP in 
2008, while in Poland remittance flows made 
up 2.1 percent and in Lithuania 3 percent of 
GDP (see table 3). Nevertheless these inflows 
affect a large number of households which 
partly depend on the money sent by family 
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Table 3:   Remittances in % of GDP, 2004-2008 
  2004 2005 2006 2007  2008e 
Bulgaria 7.0%  5.9% 5.4% 5.3% 4.2% 
Czech Republic  0.7%  0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.6% 
Estonia 1.3%  1.9%  2.4% 2.0% 1.8% 
Hungary 0.3%  0.3%  0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
Latvia 1.7%  2.4%  2.4% 1.9% 1.7% 
Lithuania 1.4%  2.2%  3.3% 3.7% 3.0% 
Poland  1.8% 2.1% 2.5% 2.8% 2.1% 
Romania 0.2%  4.8%  5.5% 5.0% 4.5% 
Slovakia 1.3%  2.0% 1.9% 2.0% 1.6% 
Slovenia 0.8%  0.7%  0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 
e = estimation 
Source: World Bank 2009 
 
 
Due to the current economic crisis the 
growth of remittances to the EU-10 countries 
slowed in 2008 – with the exception of Slove-
nia – and in the current year remittances will 
most likely decrease markedly. This is related 
to an incipient reverse migration which in-
cludes a number of Poles, Romanians and 
citizens from Baltic states who have left or will 
leave Great Britain, Ireland, Spain and other 
EU-15 countries. With respect to the British 
economy, return migration of Polish labour 
migrants is not only related to layoffs but also 
to the appreciation of the Polish Zloty against 
the British Pound, making it less attractive for 
Poles to work in Britain. In Spain, many jobs at 
construction sites were taken by immigrants 
from Central and Eastern Europe, who are 
now the first ones to loose their jobs because 
of the economic downturn. 
Most new immigrants from the EU-10 coun-
tries in the EU-15 states intended to move 
temporarily, thus they may decide to return as 
soon as they loose their jobs or as wages de-
crease seriously. As free movement of labour 
will be granted in the coming years to citizens 
of the new European Union members, remigra-
tion is an option as soon as the economic 
situation in destination countries improves. 
Therefore labour migrants from EU-10 states 
can be expected to react rather flexible to the 
economic crisis. Nevertheless, for sending 
countries the return of high numbers of labour 
migrants may put downward pressure on wage 
growth in these states, increase unemploy-
ment and potentially boost budget deficits. In 
addition, the reduction in remittance flows fol-
lowing from reverse migration will have a 
negative impact on the welfare of many 
households in the region. 
 
 
Migration and remittances in CIS coun-
tries 
In therecent decade, permanent and temporary 
labour migration remarkably gained significance 
in all CIS countries. While some states, such as 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, 
Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
are predominantly labour exporting regions, 
Russia is an immigration as well as an emigra-
tion country. According to official data 3.9 million 
foreign workers were employed in Russia in 
2008, although the number of illegal foreign 
workers was estimated to reach 12 million. Most 
of these workers come from CIS countries, 
largely from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Moldova, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. Citizens from CIS countries can 
enter Russia without a visa but they have to 
register with the local authorities to be eligible 
for a work permit. As many CIS immigrants fail 
to register, irregular foreign employment in Rus-
sia is high. The majority of foreign workers from 
CIS countries in Russia are men, and they pre-
dominantly work in construction, services, trade 
and agriculture. It is estimated that CIS coun-
tries send six to eight percent of their labour 
force abroad, with Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Moldova, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan represent-
ing the most important emigration regions. Ex-
amining the destination choice of labour mi-
grants from CIS countries remarkable differ-
ences can be observed. While most labour mi-
grants from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan move to Russia, 30 to 
40 percent of workers from Moldova, Georgia 
and Ukraine head for Western destinations. As 
for Russia, approximately 45 percent of labour 
Kurzanalysen  
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migrants relocate to Western regions, the others 
go to CIS countries. 
Connected to labour migration, the receipt 
of remittances has significantly increased in 
CIS countries between 2004 and 2008 (see 
table 4). This is additionally stressed by the 
fact that official statistics on remittances most 
likely underestimate the actual inflow of these 
resources to a considerable extent. Many mi-
grants transfer money outside the official 





Table 4:   Remittances to CIS countries, 2004-2008*  
  (US$ million) 
  2004 2005 2006 2007  2008e 
Belarus  257 255 340 354 354 
Moldova  705  920  1.182 1.498 1.550 
Russia 2.495  2.919  3.091 4.100 4.500 
Ukraine 411  595  829  4.503  5.000 
Armenia  435 498 658 846 864 
Azerbaijan 228  693  813  1.287  1.410 
Georgia  303 346 485 696 696 
Kazakhstan  166 178 187 223 250 
Kyrgyzstan  189 322 481 715 715 
Tajikistan 252  467  1.019 1.691 1.750 
* No data are available for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
e = estimation 
Source: World Bank 2009 
  
 
Between 2004 and 2007 nearly all CIS 
countries experienced double digit growth 
rates in remittances annually, and in certain 
years and in certain countries exceptionally 
higher rates (see table 5). As a result of the 
global economic crisis growth rates of remit-




Table 5:   Growth rates of remittance flows, 2004-2008* 
  2004 2005 2006 2007  2008e 
Belarus 16%  -0.8%  33%  4%  0% 
Moldova  45% 31% 28% 27%  3% 
Russia  72% 17%  6%  33% 10% 
Ukraine 25%  45%  39%  443%  11% 
Armenia 169%  14%  32%  29%  2% 
Azerbaijan  33% 204% 17%  58%  10% 
Georgia  29% 14% 40% 44%  0% 
Kazakhstan 13%  7%  5%  19%  12% 
Kyrgyzstan 142%  70%  49%  49%  0% 
Tajikistan 73%  85%  118%  66%  3% 
* No data are available for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
e = estimation 
Source: World Bank 2009 
 
 
In part, however, the reduction in remittances 
from Russia expressed in dollar terms has to 
be attributed to the Ruble depreciation against 
the US$. For 2009 remittances are expected to 
decline by five to eight percent worldwide, 
although some countries seem to be con-
fronted with higher decreases. According to 
estimations of the Asian Development Bank, 
remittances to Tajikistan will decrease by 30 
percent in 2009 and the Central Bank in 
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Moldova recorded a decrease of remittances 
by approximately 27 percent in the first three 
months of this year. The reduction of remit-
tances poses a great challenge to many CIS 
countries which depend on the inflow of remit-
tances as an important source of poverty re-
duction and of financing external imbalances. 
The relevance of remittance flows to CIS 
countries becomes even more pronounced 
when these resources are expressed as a 
percentage of their GDP (see table 6). Here 
Moldova and Tajikistan stand out, where the 
receipt of remittances amounted to 34 percent 
and 45 percent of their GDP in 2007 respec-
tively. Accordingly, these two countries be-
longed to the most important remittances re-
ceiving regions worldwide, with Tajikistan com-
ing first and Moldova second. However, these 
countries experienced a particularly severe 
decrease of remittances as a percentage of 
GDP between 2007 and 2008. 
 
Table 6:   Remittances in % of GDP, 2004-2008* 
  2004 2005 2006 2007  2008e
Belarus  1.1%    0.8% 0.9% 0.8% 0.6%
Moldova 27.1%  30.8% 34.7% 34.1% 25.3%
Russia 0.4%  0.4% 0.3% 0.3%  0.3%
Ukraine 0.6%  0.7% 0.8% 3.1% 2.8%
Armenia 12.2%  10.2% 10.3% 9.2% 7.2%
Azerbaijan 2.6%  5.2% 3.9% 4.1% 3.0%
Georgia 5.9%  5.4% 6.2% 6.8% 5.4%
Kazakhstan 0.4%  0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Kyrgyzstan 8.5%  13.1% 17.0% 18.8% 14.2%
Tajikistan 12.2%  20.2% 36.4% 45.6% 34.1%
* No data are available for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
e = estimation 
Source: World Bank 2009 
 
In looking at the development of remittance 
flows in the CIS region, there is evidence for a 
– partly serious – drop of these financial re-
sources. Russia, the most important destina-
tion of foreign labour from CIS countries suf-
fers from a spill-over of the global financial 
crisis and a decrease in oil prices. The result-
ing slowdown of the economy especially af-
fects the construction sector and trade which 
employ high numbers of immigrants. In an 
effort to secure jobs for natives, Russian Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin announced to cut the 
quota of legal migrants by up to a half in De-
cember 2008. Furthermore, the Russian gov-
ernment declared to strengthen the fight 
against irregular labour migrants. Therefore, 
immigrants in Russia will be increasingly con-
fronted with harsh labour market conditions, 
i.e. cut of wages or loss of jobs. While some 
labour migrants might return, the bulk of for-
eign workers will stay in Russia, as their – 
generally poorer – home country economies 
also suffer from the global crisis. While officials 
and the population in Russia defeat further 
labour migration, the demand for foreign work-
ers prevails. Big construction companies in 
Russia that cut their work places by 30 percent 
in 2008, and are expected to reduce them to 
50 percent in 2009, still stick to foreign workers 
as these are cheaper and more flexible. As in 
many industrialized economies, unemployed 
natives in Russia are not prepared to carry out 
jobs usually filled by foreigners. Thus, while a 
number of labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan return, there is also 
evidence of an increasing number of migrants 
from these countries to leave for Russia since 
the economic crisis in fall 2008 (Marat 2009). 
Nevertheless, fewer migrants can be expected 
to find a job in Russia, resulting in an overall 
decrease of remittance flows to their home 
countries. 
For Western destinations, particularly the 
European Union, where labour migrants from 
CIS countries occupy jobs in construction, 
agriculture and services, labour market pros-
pects are bleak as well. Because many labour 
migrants from CIS countries in Western desti-
nations perform irregular work, they are espe-
cially exposed to job losses. Furthermore, 
European Union countries enforce immigration 
regulations and increase their fight against 
irregular labour migrants. The Spanish gov-
ernment, for example, announced to limit the 
Kurzanalysen  
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admission of foreign workers and to encourage 
immigrants to leave under a plan of voluntary 
return. Yet most migrants from CIS countries 
have a strong incentive to stay abroad, as they 
need to organize (costly) transit documents to 
return and face unemployment and economic 
hardship at home.  
 
 
Summary and outlook 
The current economic crisis resulted in de-
creasing growth rates of remittances to Central 
and Eastern European and CIS countries in 
2008, and in 2009 a reduction of remittance 
flows is expected. While in the EU-10 countries 
this development will lower the welfare of 
many remittances receiving households, the 
economic risks of shrinking remittances are 
much higher in a number of CIS countries. For 
several post-Soviet economies, such as Arme-
nia, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, remit-
tances are a major source of family income 
and foreign exchange. Thus, a cutback of re-
mittances will negatively impact poverty reduc-
tion and the economic development in these 
countries. Additionally there is evidence that 
remittances are more stable than private capi-
tal flows. 
The further development of remittances in 
the current economic crisis is difficult to pre-
dict. While some studies have shown that the 
flow of remittances has been relatively stable 
in the past, behaved counter-cyclically and had 
a positive effect on output stability (Chami et 
al. 2009), other research found remittances 
positively related to the business cycle in the 
home countries of labour migrants (Lueth and 
Ruiz-Arranz 2008). However, compared to 
previous economic crisis situations, this reces-
sion affects migration and remittances more 
severe because the crisis is global by nature 
and because remittances to many developing 
economies are much higher than in the past. 
The deeper the crisis and the longer it lasts 
in immigration countries the greater will be the 
decline in remittances. The tightening of immi-
gration regulations and the increase of anti-
immigration sentiments in many destination 
countries are likely to reduce labour migration 
additionally and thus further depress remit-
tance flows. In those cases, where migrants 
return, wages in home countries will come 
under pressure and unemployment rates are 
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